Your vote counts

During October we asked our customers and Twitter followers a simple question - if you were spending our money, what car would you buy next?  We decided to keep things simple and limit the choice to 5. Here's how hundreds of you voted.

Ford Mustang - 48%
Caterham - 13%
X1/9 - 16%
Morris Marina - 6%
MGB GT - 18%

Perhaps not entirely surprisingly, the Mustang smashed it. With a fleet of 60 cars it is probably our one main omission - something that thanks to everyone who voted, I am to resolve during 2015. I can't guarantee it will happen quickly as there are a lot of Mustangs and I want the right car. And with our choice of company name, you probably know what I mean....

Thank you to everyone who voted, it is really helpful to know what people really want to drive and how popular different cars are. As well as kicking off that long delayed search for a Mustang, I will be adding the two next most popular cars to the fleet - a Fiat X1/9 and MGB GT. We have bought a couple of project cars that will be going through our workshop over the winter. The X1/9 is a bit of a left-field choice yet one of those cars that should be great for our driving days. The car I've bought is one of the last 'Grand Finale' cars - it has the big bumpers but try finding an early car without them. 

I am particularly looking forward to the BGT - I've never been much of a MG fan but I owned a BGT a few years ago and really liked its mix of junior GT performance and practicality. It is a very different car to the MGB roadster. Our new BGT came from a MGB specialist and although it looks dusty and dishevelled in the photos is extremely solid.  It has an uprated engine and was converted from a rubber bumper car about 10 years ago - the work was done well and it even has the correct chrome bumper front wings. By the time we've finished it will be indistinguishable from a 'real' chrome car. 

I have to confess I'm very undecided about a Caterham. One of the things I've learnt over the last 8 years is that I only sleep at night when I'm hiring cars that I feel safe driving, mainly because if I feel safe then I feel our customers will be safe too. If that feels a bit namby pamby then blame John DeLorean and his collapsible DMC-12, which we had on the fleet a couple of years ago. Maybe one day.

And that leaves the Morris Marina. Which is a phrase no doubt often said in relation to BL's mass market motor. Whether 6% of you thought it would be funny to send me on an errand to buy a Marina or they genuinely consider the Marina a better hire prospect than the Mustang, I cannot judge. All I will say is that as an Allegro owner, it seems like only a small step to Marina ownership. 

So, thank you again. We have acted on your choices and I'll keep you updated on the Mustang. 

I will post progress on the X1/9 and MGBGT on Twitter and this blog, or visit or call 01527 893733. 


01527 893733

More big cats than Longleat

A few weeks ago we added an Allegro to our classic car hire fleet. Quite a lot of heads were scratched, but it has been popular. Now we've brought another motoring waif in from the cold - the Jaguar XJS.

The new XJS means that we now have 10 classic Jaguars to hire from our Midlands site - from Series 1 E Type to first generation XKR.

Like the Allegro, the XJS is one of those cars that, while not quite hated like the All-aggro, is generally sneered at. Its history is familiar to classic car fans - it was the E Type replacement that wasn't. And that, for many, is where the story ends.

Except if doesn't really. The inquisitive will know, or soon discover, that the XJS is more, much more, than a failed replacement for the E Type. Which is why we've added a second one to our hire fleet - a V12 coupe to complement our existing V12 convertible. Whereas the convertible's case is easier to argue because it has that extra sunshine-friendly string to its bow, the coupe has always faced more of an uphill struggle. And yet the XJS coupe is, perhaps, the better car.  To understand that you need to understand the XJS better.

The original E Type slotted into a particular place and time, one where a relatively small, compact sports car was in demand. The trouble is that small, compact sports cars generally don't make much money and Jaguar never charged much for them. The E Type shared few components with other Jags so was particularly costly to make. Despite its initial popularity, the original E Type wasn't really much of a practical proposition - the doors were small, the cabin cramped and the ventilation non-existent.  To solve the financial problem Jaguar tried to shunt the car upmarket, creating the larger and more luxurious Series 3 V12, a car that was more GT tourer than sports car. Although an excellent car, the Series 3 could only be a compromise.

Cue the XJS. British Leyland's blind stupidity has been well documented, but when it came to the XJS the planning and thinking was much less befuddled. The XJS began its life before BL, designed by Malcolm Sayer - who designed the E Type of course - and with input from William Lyons (it was the last car he helped design). From the outset it was conceived to be a luxurious grand tourer utilising as many shared underpinnings as possible in order to keep costs down. So the XJS is essentially a short wheelbase XJ saloon - given that the XJ was possibly the best saloon car in the world at the time, it wasn't a bad starting point. The body design was intended to maximise aerodynamic efficiency whilst also being up to date. In this it is fair to say that Sayer and Lyons may have dropped the ball briefly. The XJS is certainly a bold design, but it steals a lot of design cues from other cars. It took a long time to create and there is evidence of considerable fiddling around with details, in the process perhaps losing sight of what may have been a more cohesive design. So, on early cars, the overall effect was of a car that seemed to miss the mark somewhat, not helped by being so very different from the E Type.

The XJS also suffered from BL mismanagement, rather inevitably. Besides the ugly after-thought federal bumpers on the first cars (with the original chrome bumpers painted black), the interior felt unfinished. In order to keep costs down Jaguar reused a lot of XJ interior parts, none of which looked particularly at home in the more upmarket XJS. The first cars also lacked wood, something they were criticised for despite E Types never having it either.

All of these foibles tended to overshadow the XJS' many strengths. The E Type is undeniably gorgeous but is generally outclassed in terms of handling and ride by most of its peers. Until late in life it also featured quite outdated engines. None of these problems faced the XJS. It handled and rode incredibly well, far better than any GT car of the era, and it had the peerless fuel injected V12. Add in a practical cabin with four seats, a good size boot and decent ventilation and you had a good value package that could rival anything from Germany.

The trouble was, of course, that British Leyland rather struggled to build anything on four wheels well. So the XJS, flung as it was into the competitive and demanding world of luxury GT cars, faced an uphill struggle. It rusted, broke down, fell apart and generally disintegrated very quickly. Add in catastrophic fuel consumption during the 70s fuel crisis and you had a recipe for disaster.

By the late 70s Jaguar was seriously considering ditching the XJS due to poor sales. But the company's new management chose instead to invest in design improvements and an overhaul of the engine to improve fuel efficiency. The XJS of the 1980s was better built and looked considerably better with chrome bumpers and wood trimmed interior.

Jaguar also invested in new variants including a 3.6 litre straight six and a cabriolet, which spawned a full convertible. So, remarkably late in life the XJS suddenly came into its own. 1988 was the car's turning point when improved specification and wheels and a full convertible became available.

The XJS received another life-giving injection in 1990 when investment by Ford led to a redesign with new bumpers, bonnet and side windows plus a 6 litre version of the V12 and a 4 litre version of the straight six. The 4 litre in particular provided performance comparable to the earlier V12 but without quite the same hefty fuel consumption. This new incarnation lived on into the mid 1990s when the 21 year design was finally pensioned off and replaced with the XK8. A car, incidentally, that was really just a XJS under its svelte new skin.

The XJS' longevity and late flowering sales success is down to continuous development and a mellowing of the original design. Whereas the E Type was very much a product of its time, one that began to look dated long before its 10th birthday, the XJS proved far more durable. Even in the 90s, thanks to that clever makeover, it still looked relevant and, frankly, pretty good. The car's innate qualities of silky V12 and magic carpet ride also helped it hold its own amongst younger usurpers.

And yet, only a few short years ago, you could buy a very good XJS for a fraction of the price of an E Type. A shade over four figures would get you into a MOT'd car in presentable condition. Today, while values are hardly startling, they are beginning to lift off the floor.

The XJS will always be the Jaguar that splits opinion. But to the naysayers I say - try it. Approach a good XJS with an open mind and you'll be surprised at how well it fulfills its Grand Touring brief.

Our latest addition is a 1988 V12 XJS coupe in light metallic blue with a dark blue leather interior. It's a mid-period car so benefits from aesthetic and quality improvements introduced in the 1980s, whilst retaining the original features and lines of the first cars.

To find out more about hiring the XJS coupe from our Midlands site call 01527 893733 or visit Prices start at £150 for 24 hrs.

01527 893733

The Golden Phoenix

British cars, specifically British cars made by the mass of car makers who became British Leyland, are our stock in trade. The history of British Leyland has more twists and turns than Eastenders, particularly in its final days under The Phoenix Four. 
So when news stories began appearing this week about Messrs Beale, Towers et al I was immediately interested. I'll be honest, I've always bought the line that the famous four feathered their own nests and hung the workers out to dry. This view was largely based on media reports and local anecdotes, for example about the sale of Studley Castle, the former BL management centre located a few miles from the Great Escape site. Like most people I have never had the time to peruse the 800 page Government report into MG Rover's collapse. 
Now, thanks to a link on a Facebook group, I have. Not every word, I have to admit, but most of it. I have sacrificed a considerable amount of my already depleted brain cells to bring you a summary of what The Phoenix Four actually got up to. So here it is a bitesized analysis of what killed MG Rover split into the main topic areas.

Sale by BMW
When Beemer decided to bail it sold the good bit - Land Rover - very easily, leaving it with the less desirable rump of MG and Rover. Everybody, including the Government, knew that this business was not viable in its current form, due to inefficient factories and ancient products.  So either it would have to be drastically slimmed down or partnered with a suitable cash-rich car maker.  This is why BMW provided a £500m 'dowry' to the Phoenix consortium to take the problem off their hands. 

The BMW deal seems to have been concluded very quickly, particularly compared to the slow pace of the SAIC JV. This seems to suggest a lack of due diligence with BMW rather than a criticism of SAIC.  Quite why it all had to happen so quickly is unclear but certainly issues like a business plan and the pension shortfall don't seem to have received serious analysis by the Consortium. BMW gave Towers and his partners £500m to offload the English Patient - whether your plans are short or long term, that dowry alone feels pretty persuasive.

The Phoenix Four
The saviours of British Leyland were:

John Towers - former managing director of Rover
Peter Beale - finance director who previously worked for a Rover dealer in Stratford 
Nick Stephenson - engineer who was a former director of Rover/BMW
John Edwards - ran a Rover dealership in Stratford

Towers and Beale are generally acknowledged as well equipped for the roles they played in the business. Stephenson and Edwards, according to the Government report, were competent in their specialist fields but were pushed well beyond their competences and comfort zone.

Business Structure
From the start the structure of the Phoenix Four deal should have raised alarm bells. The four formed a limited partnership and set up a business called Techtronic. Techtronic 'bought' MG Rover and received the loan from BMW. By design or coincidence this structure enabled the directors to distance their financial liability and risk from the actual business they had bought - and keep the cash outside the floundering car company. In effect Techtronic lent money to MG Rover (which had to be paid back) and earns interest on the loan. This arrangement generated a surplus which was fed back to the limited partnership. So whatever happened at MG Rover, careful management of funds at Techtronic would enable the directors to benefit from surpluses created by interest on the invested BMW loan and on loans to MG Rover. It didn't matter if the BMW loan was run down and MG Rover defaulted - short term they would gain, receiving funds that didn't need to be paid back. 

The Risks Taken by The Phoenix Four
The four directors made much at the time of the purchase of their personal risk - and repeated this line after the collapse. However, the Government report finds that this simply wasn't true - there was no personal risk. According to the directors they stumped up seed cash required to fund the bid and underwrote legal fees. In fact they each put in £60,000 and did not underwrite legal fees. In the circumstances while £60k is a significant sum, taken against the windfall of interest on £500m it was hardly a risk. Similarly, immediately on signing the deal the directors awarded themselves £1m 'reward' to be paid by MG Rover. Instead of paying themselves this money they opted to take 'loan notes' - while this kept cash in MG Rover it also earns the directors even more money as interest accrued to them on these notes. They called in the loan during their tenure. 

Director Remuneration
We all expect the people at the top to look after themselves. The Phoenix Four did this quite well. Each was paid well in excess of the salaries paid to directors of other UK car companies including Ford. Their combined bonus packages were in some cases double comparable firms. None of the directors except Towers had ever earned salaries even close to the sums they claimed. Yet apparently they complained that they were being underpaid. The four directors were able to agree their remuneration between them - there wereno external checks or approval required. 

Director Bonuses
Throughout its ownership by The Phoenix Four MG Rover's finances were on the slide. It sold less cars and made less money year on year. To survive it sold assets and worked through the BMW dowry. Despite this the directors awarded themselves bonuses of around £20m. Even in a company like MG Rover directors have to justify the basis on which bonuses are awarded and so they did this by using 'milestones' like car sales and progress with various Joint Venture projects. Except these claims never stacked up - whilst car sales floundered and JVs stagnated the directors funnelled millions in the form of 'bonuses' into an offshore pension fund directly from MG Rover funds - well out of reach of the administrator. So, the directors earnt money via Techtronic and directly via MG Rover. 

MG Capital
The latest news stories concern the disposal of MG Capital by the receiver. This has resulted in another cash bonus for The Phoenix Four. They have argued that they risked their own personal assets to buy MG Capital and therefore they should benefit. Except, according to the Government report, they didn't.  They used the loan notes that they awarded themselves to underwrite loans obtained to fund the purchase. As the loans were awarded from MG Rover funds, a decision proposed and agreed only by the directors, this can hardly be said to be a risk - if something went wrong they ultimately had access to a £500m pot that would pay the loans. The MG Capital deal was similarly hugely favourable to them that any short term 'risk' was far outweighed by the benefit. For their individual 'investments' of a few hundred thousand pounds in MG Capital, each director appears to have received several million pounds.

Were the directors committed to MG Rover?
I think it would be churlish to suggest that the four simply took the deal for short term gain. They definitely worked extremely hard to make the business work and throughout their tenure many good decisions were made - rejuvenating the MG brand on mainstream cars being an obvious master stroke. They pursued the essential joint venture relentlessly although somewhat cackhandedly. But they knew saving MG Rover was a risky prospect, so they made sure that whatever happened they would also gain if it failed. 

The Joint Venture
There was a very real prospect of MG Rover being sold to the Chinese. The deal failed because of MG Rover's parlous finances. The JV was led by Nick Stephenson who is criticised in the Government report for being out of his depth. The SAIC project suffered from poor communication leading to unnecessary delays, which in turn it more spotlight on the finances. It seems obvious from the report that Towers and Beale, arguably the most experienced senior directors, had little direct involvement in the negotiations. This was left to Stephenson and a consultant called Dr Li. The arms-length approach taken by Beale and Towers, who in interviews quoted by the report claim little knowledge of the detail of the deal, seems the oddest part of this tale. Sure, they had an ailing business to run so a project manager was required. But when the success of the deal was the single over-riding objective of the partnership and the only route to long term stability, was it wise for the most experienced directors to stand back, only stepping in right at the end? Stephenson seemed to be so comfortable in the role that he gave the Chinese a last ditch ultimatum without consulting anyone else. 
This odd state of affairs meant that the JV project proceeded quite haphazardly from MG Rover's side and Stephenson had a lot of free reign. For instance, he was in a relationship with Dr Li, MG Rover's specialist consultant on the project. She received a huge consultancy fee from MG Rover - far exceeding any fees she got from previous clients - ad well as six figure 'success' bonuses for achieving various milestones. There is a lot of debate around what she actually contributed. But it is fact, according to the report, that her bonuses were agreed by Stephenson and, in each case, paid on the same day they were agreed - at a time when MG Rover couldn't pay its main suppliers. 
The JV negotiations dragged on and MG Rover's finances headed south. The deal failed because SAIC didn't want to take on these risks and debts, none of which The Phoenix Four was able to adequately explain away. 
The failure of the JV must in part be due to the absence of a Plan B. With hindsight MG Rover's parlous finances were always going to put the deal at risk and the longer the deal was delayed the bigger this problem would become. The directors don't seem to have had a contingency plan - either because they didn't realise how bad things were (quite likely) or because they were simply fire fighting (also seems likely). MG Rover tried to raise funds by selling assets but this could only ever be fiddling around the margins. In my limited opinion the directors should have approached the Government much earlier to highlight their problems and request assistance to underwrite the deal. 

The Government
A lot of flak was thrown at the Labour Government for failing to assist MG Rover and save the deal. It seems likely that when Towers et al bought MG Rover the Government realised it was a lost cause. Funding the company's continued survival was felt to be an expensive option compared to providing regional assistance if it failed. The company's structure - which effectively funnelled cash to the directors as explained above - may also have created resistance to any Government loan. However, closer communication between the Government and company from the start might have helped speed up the Chinese deal - and flagged up the risk of failure caused by MG Rover's poor cash position. 

The Chinese
The various deals and agreements entered into and the sale of different assets and intellectual property to various Chinese companies is confusing and, ultimately, not that relevant to the main issue. Which is that SAIC clearly intended to buy MG Rover. It was the British company that caused the deal to collapse, not SAIC. As the deal dragged on - as these things tend to - SAIC realised that its exposure to risk and debt was increasing. In MG Rover it had a rather shifty co-conspirator which proved rather adept at providing half-truths and indulging in smoke and mirrors when it came to supplying information. It is reasonable to suggest that SAIC had a Plan B - namely that dragging dealings out made MG Rover weaker and therefore cheaper. But I think SAIC would have preferred to buy MG Rover as a going concern - the company's collapse and the loss of key talent surely wasn't desirable. SAIC did pick over the bones when the receiver was called in but it arguably failed to get what it really wanted - the technical know-how and quick access to the European market. The report makes clear that SAIC was patient despite being messed around. 

The Workers
Forget all the history of worker-employer dissent at BL, by the time the Phoenix Four arrived the staff were remarkably committed to the MG Rover ship. They had suffered through several false dawns and the arrival of Towers et al felt like the company was back in the hands of people who cared. People, if you will, 'like us.' And who could blame them - in the Longbridge area many families had worked at the factory for generations - 'the Rover' was in their blood. For me this makes what The Phoenix Four did all the more disreputable. Sure, they wanted to save MG Rover. But unlike the workers they had a Plan B. I think that fall back doomed the company from the start - when you know you'll be a millionaire whatever happens, why bother trying to be a mega millionaire? 

The Pension Fund
In contrast to the burgeoning pension fund for the directors, the employee fund was in a bad way - apparently around £400m short of its liabilities. Little is actually made of this in the report but I suspect this problem alone would have been enough to push the Chinese deal over the abyss. Why buy a company riddled with such liabilities and without an obvious upside? The pension problem was a ticking time bomb that should have been addressed as part of the BMW sale. This pension deficit simply got worse and worse under Towers and co, with little or no effort to resolve it. Whether this is indicative of their short term plans or naivety, who knows. 

Could MG Rover have survived? 
When BMW offloaded the remains of BL few seriously expected it to survive. MG Rover was a mass manufacturer with a tiny output compared to its rivals. Its products were outdated, with nothing new in the pipeline, it's manufacturing was outdated and it was underfunded, even with the BMW dowry. While Land Rover and Jaguar were arguably in the same place at the same time, they were niche makers with clear strengths in their chosen areas - canny investment would enable them to build on that good start. Only MG could be said to have something similar - but with only one aging product and a ropey reputation. Rover as a brand was dead in the water after years of nailing the Trident to everything from superminis to Hondas. 
Even partnering MG Rover to a Chinese company feels like a doomed endeavour. Whatever the value of the brands, MG Rover needed so much investment in all areas of the business that it would surely have been better to buy the best bits, lure the talent and start afresh. Against a backdrop of contracting European car volumes and over-capacity, any investment in MG Rover has to feel misguided. 
That said, MG Rover could have survived, I think. A small capacity specialist company based around the MG brand and informally partnered with a major manufacturer for engines and components could have worked. BMW's success with the MINI perhaps shows how this could have been done. 
While this would have saved few jobs and lost Longbridge, it may have avoided the slow death experienced by the workers and the loss of their pension pot. 

Whatever could have happened, it doesn't overshadow what did happen. The media loves pantomime baddies and while it would be wrong to see The Phoenix Four as simply bad, they don't come out of the MG Rover fiasco covered in glory. I don't deny that the directors of private firms are concerned first and foremost with themselves. This is how capitalism works. The problem in their case is the extent to which they protected themselves from risk, and managed their own interests, at the expense of the risk and interests of the company and its workers. A failing company, for instance, cannot afford to pay its directors more than directors of comparable, more successful, businesses. And the morality of siphoning off millions of pounds for personal gain when the same company cannot meet its pension obligations is also dubious. Both these things may be legal, but that doesn't necessarily make them right. 

Unlike Governments, directors of private companies are not democratically accountable. What The Phoenix Four did wasn't illegal, so they've kept their millions. They may even feel it was justifiable due to the 'risks' they took. But none of that detracts from that simple fact that a cash-strapped company does not benefit from draining large sums of cash to a few directors, contributing to its failure. That is The Phoenix Four's legacy. 


This post represents my own views based on a reading of the Government report into the collapse of MG Rover. Due to the complexity of the issues and the length of the report I am happy to stand corrected on any of the issues or answer any questions. 

Looking forward is the new looking back

Progress s a funny old game. Some of us march along at a merry old pace, some of us dawdle and meander somewhat more slowly. Before embarking on a life surrounded by classic metal I liked to think of myself as progressive. But age and old crocks have a funny way of changing things. 
Today the world of progress is spinning faster than ever and none more so than in the world of cars. Or so I hear. Because in the funny old game that is classic car hire, progress is defined rather differently. As relatively modern cars become classics we're starting to add 80s and 90s cars to our fleet. Most motorists revel in the latest Bluetooth technology and head-up displays, here at Great Escape we're getting excited all over again at the prospect of central locking and electric windows. And power steering. 

I've become so immersed in these old cars that these innovations really do feel like modern day progress. Which perhaps demonstrates how far cars have evolved since the 80s and early 90s. And, in all honesty, it is quite exciting. Because the 80s really were the turning point for in-car technology. Up until then progress was an in-car radio. Suddenly in the 80s cars had power steering, in-car 'entertainment' (that'll be an auto-reverse cassette deck), electric windows, Central locking, electric seats and 'digital' clocks. Some even had heated seats. Not to mention proper heating and ventilation. 
Cars of the 1980s are now proper classics. They may feel modern but that's only because the 80s introduced technology that we recognise - electronics became commonplace and cars became noticeably more reliable. These cars may still be a far cry from self-driving modern day marvels but they're much more closely related than the cars of the 70s which lacked the electronic advances of the 80s. 

This sudden progress reflected advances in manufacturing techniques and technology. Fiat lauded it's Strada as 'built by robots' (driven by morons...). Automation ruled. This was the decade of robots, electronics and automated machines, from car manufacturing to music. The resulting cars were more innovative than the ones they replaced and also more reliable. 
So here at Great Escape we're excited by progress. Sure, it's progress circa 1981 but that's how we roll here in the parallel universe that is classic car hire. We're looking forward to adding more 1980s cars like our Capri, XJS', Allegro and Saab 900s. These cars are bonafide classics that are tougher and more reliable than their forebears. 

To discover our range of classic 1980s hire cars visit or call 01527 893733

Around Britain in 40 cars

Classic hire cars can be, lets be blunt, prima donnas. Like certain celebrities they are much in demand, know it, and like to play up at the most inopportune moment.
So when we got the call to provide cars for the BBC's popular Celebrity Antiques Road Trip series we jumped at the chance. We thrive on stress. We have to.  And it can be a positive thing in the right circumstances. And surely combining classic cars with celebrities is exactly such a circumstance. 
Celebrity Antiques Road Trip, in case you're not familiar with the format, has been running for a few years and is the star-studded version of the long-running Antiques Road Trip series.  Two celebrities pair up with two antiques experts and a duo of racey classics to travel from point A to B across Britain, buying antiques as they go and then auctioning them - hopefully for a profit - at the end. 
Great Escape Cars originally began supplying classics to the series in 2009 but in 2013 the producers asked us to supply all 40 cars for the series. Previously, as avid viewers will know, the series had a reputation for unreliable classics. To help salvage the name of old cars everywhere we decided to source the cars only from our regular hire fleet. 

The success of the 2013 project - which resulted in only one car breaking down - meant that we were chosen to provide the cars to the 2014 Celebrity series as well as the regular non-celebrity series. This has involved continuous filming with the cars since May, with final shooting at the end of October. During this time most of our fleet has featured on camera with a huge range of TV and film stars. The cars and the stars proved to be nothing like the divas we were expecting, being reliable and friendly respectively. This despite the cars travelling thousands of miles across Britain in pursuit of the perfect antique purchase.

The cars are moved around the UK using our fleet of car transporters and trailers. We have two twin-deck car transporters and two single car trailers, which gives us the flexibility to cope with different locations, some of which are unsuitable for LGVs. Our drivers are experienced with film work and have completed CPC training to operate heavy vehicles. Between May and October our staff and trucks have put in thousands of hours and miles moving cars to assist the location crews creating the programmes.  

The Celebrity Antiques Road Trip 2014 series was aired on BBC2 during September and the Antiques Road Trip 2014 will appear on screens in the winter.  To find out more about what cars were used and where call 01527 893733 or email To discuss film projects call Graham on 01527 893733 or visit our TV and film pages.